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Designing a global pricing strategy for a new pharmaceutical 
product has become increasingly difficult as geographic reference 
pricing and parallel trade have introduced global price 
interdependencies between different nations.  What may have 
been an optimal pricing strategy in a single country may no 
longer be optimal when considering the international 
ramifications of this price.  The prices set by the pharmaceutical 
company will affect whether a pharmaceutical prescription 
product is accepted in each country, whether each country will 
participate in parallel trade (either as an importer or an exporter), 
and the prices charged in other countries.  It may even affect the 
desirability of launching a product in a country.  After examining 
lessons learned from a hypothetical case study, the general model 
formulation is presented. Optimization techniques from the 
decision sciences can be used to assist pharmaceutical companies 
with their strategic pricing decisions.   
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The Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI) is an educational institution 
sponsored and supervised by the Secretary of Defense and located at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.  Since 1965 the Institute has conducted 
professional education programs in analytical decision making and resources 
management for military officers of all services and for senior civilian officials of the 
United States and 149 other countries.   
The mission of the Defense Resources Management Institute is to educate civilian and 
military government officials in the principles and concepts of defense resources 
management.   
 
The unique course offerings create an interdisciplinary, interactive learning environment 
that facilitates the exchange of ideas among U.S. and international participants in 
Monterey, California, and locations worldwide.  These programs are presented on a 
regularly scheduled basis at DRMI in Monterey and by specific arrangement at other 
locations in the United States and in other countries. 
 
The success of DRMI reflects the breadth and depth of the in-house technical expertise 
that DRMI can draw upon.  The DRMI Faculty, a community of scholars and 
practitioners, are experts in defense resources management and has published in major 
academic and technical journals.  The faculty has extensive experience in providing 
technical assistance and educational programs worldwide over the past 40 years.  Our 
educational strategy is one of collaboration, tailored to the specific environment of the 
participant. 
 
The Defense Resources Management Institute specializes in four broad educational areas: 
 
• Economic analysis of the public sector 
• Operations research of public sector decision problems 
• Public budgeting and fiscal management  
• Defense organizations and management methods 
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Designing a global pricing strategy for a new pharmaceutical product has become 
increasingly difficult as geographic reference pricing and parallel trade have introduced 
global price interdependencies between different nations.  What may have been an 
optimal pricing strategy in a single country may no longer be optimal when considering 
the international ramifications of this price.  The prices set by the pharmaceutical 
company will affect whether a pharmaceutical prescription product is accepted in each 
country, whether each country will participate in parallel trade (either as an importer or 
an exporter), and the prices charged in other countries.  It may even affect the desirability 
of launching a product in a country.  After examining lessons learned from a hypothetical 
case study, the general model formulation is presented. Optimization techniques from the 
decision sciences can be used to assist pharmaceutical companies with their strategic 







The pharmaceutical industry is faced with numerous issues and competing risks when it 
sets prices for a new prescription-based product [1,2].  One difficulty when designing a 
global pricing strategy for a new pharmaceutical product is the existence of global price 
interdependencies.  These interdependencies arise through two primary sources, 
geographic reference pricing and parallel trade.   
 
Due to pressures on national health care systems, countries frequently choose to regulate 
and/or set prices for pharmaceutical prices.  If the prices are not directly regulated, they 
are often restricted by reimbursement policies.  To help determine the levels at which a 
drug should be reimbursed, geographical reference pricing (i.e. a comparison of the same 
product or product class sold in a selection of other countries) is employed.  The selection 
of comparator countries varies for each country practicing geographical reference pricing, 
but often include countries that have very disparate income levels, gross domestic 
product, and usage levels of pharmaceutical products.  Frequently these benchmarking 
comparisons are designed to maintain historic price differentials among the countries.   
While geographic reference pricing originated in Europe, it is now practiced by many 
countries worldwide [1].    
 
The practice of geographical reference pricing implies that the pricing decision of 
prescription-based pharmaceutical products in the countries is linked – i.e. the choice of a 
price in one country may affect the potential prices in a number of other countries. 
 
Parallel trade, the parallel importing of drugs across national boundaries, is another 
pricing link that pharmaceutical companies need to take into account when designing a 
global pricing strategy.  Parallel trade arises when a third party can purchase the 
pharmaceutical product in countries with lower prices and resell them to countries with 
higher prices.  Within the free trade zones, such as that seen in the European Union, this 
activity is no longer illegal and is likely to occur once the price differentials are large 
enough.  Chaudry and Walsh [3] found that a differential of 15% was sufficient for 
parallel trade to occur in countries that are in proximity to each other.  Parallel imports 
may even be supported by some countries in the hopes of lowering their national health 
care expenditures. [4,5]   
 
One region, much discussed in the literature, where both parallel trade and global 
reference pricing occur is the European Union (EU).  The countries in the EU are in close 
proximity to each other and rulings from the European Court of Justice have upheld the 
free transport of goods, including pharmaceutical products and services, among member 
nations [6, 7].  Parallel importing among these nations is growing and often nationally 
encouraged [3, 6, 8, 9].   Member nations have varying market sizes for pharmaceuticals 
[10]; varying cultural biases in the use of pharmaceutical medications over other forms of 
treatment [8, 11]; and gross domestic product [12].  There have also been historical price 
differences among member nations [6, 8-10, 13].  Each country has a national healthcare 
system and uses nationally established price controls and reimbursement policies to 
control the cost of these healthcare systems [8, 10, 13-16].  Several member countries 
engage in geographical reference pricing when determining reimbursement prices for 
pharmaceutical products in their country [8, 9, 16, 17].   
 
Since the price for a pharmaceutical product set in one market may influence may other 
markets through these two types of interdependencies, it is important for the 
pharmaceutical company to examine the impact of a global pricing (and launch) strategy 
in an analytical fashion.  What may have been an optimal pricing strategy in a single 
country may no longer be optimal when considering the international ramifications of this 
price.  The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how optimization techniques from the 
decision sciences can be used to assist pharmaceutical companies with their strategic 
pricing decisions.  The work is conceptual and does not purport to cover all the 
dimensions of the strategic pricing decision which a company might face in practice.  
Nevertheless, it demonstrates how optimization techniques can be applied to some of the 
key elements of the problem.   
 
The paper first presents a small case study of a strategic pricing problem in three 
hypothetical countries.  The case study highlights the issues that surround the strategic 
pricing decision and the complications that can arise.  The global reference pricing 
policies described are hypothetical but are loosely based on some policies found in 
Europe.  The paper then provides the formulation of the general problem as a 
mathematical optimization problem and discusses solution techniques.  Finally, the 




A pharmaceutical company is considering its strategic pricing decision with respect to a 
new prescription drug in three countries (Acacia, Beta, and Celsia).  The movement of 
pharmaceutical products among the countries is not restricted and the countries are in 
close proximity to each other.  Each country provides national healthcare to its citizens, 
including some form of reimbursement of prescription medicines.  Since the new product 
provides therapeutic benefits in a life-threatening illness, the elasticity of demand is very 
limited.  Therefore, in each country, the quantity demanded is constant over time for a 
range of prices.  As long as the price remains within the acceptable range, the country 
will completely satisfy its demand.  However, there exists a price above which the 
demand goes to zero as countries are no longer willing to provide this medication 
(believing that the monies could be used to obtain greater improvements in health 
elsewhere).   The maximum price varies by country and is based on the country’s 
historical willingness-to-pay for medications.  Let t be the time interval for the model. 
 
All three countries practice geographical reference pricing.  Details are provided below 
with the descriptions of the three countries.  A summary of the relevant country 
characteristics is provided in Table 1.   
 
Acacia : A wealthy country that has a large sub-population (n = 900) who would benefit 
from the new prescription medicine.  It has a cultural bias that has led it to be a 
historically large consumer of prescription medicines and is willing to pay a premium for 
novel drugs.  However, it does not feel that it should carry the other countries’ drug 
burden and once the medication is marketed in another country, it will only permit the 
average price of the medication, adjusted for purchasing power parity, to be charged.  
The purchasing power parity conversion rate (the exchange rate between two countries 
that is the ratio of the two countries' price level of a fixed basket of goods and services) 
between Acacia and Beta is 1.1 and between Acacia and Celsia is 1.5.   Therefore, the 
price in Acacia is constrained by 
PAmax = $5 / dose 
PAt ≤ average {1.1*PBt, 1.5*PCt}.   
 
Beta : A moderately wealthy country that has a small sub-population (n = 250) who 
would benefit from the new prescription medicine.  It historically has been a large 
consumer of prescription medicine, but it is wealthy enough that it will pay a moderate 
amount for novel drugs .  Beta firmly believes that it should always pay less than Acacia 
for its medications since they are not as wealthy a nation.  Therefore, it ensures that its 
price is always 10% less expensive than that which is paid in Acacia unless the product is 
marketed in all three countries.  At this point, Beta feels that the drug is no longer novel 
and should be priced at a 50% discount of its maximum price.  Therefore, the price in 
Beta is constrained by 
PBmax = $4 / dose  
PBt ≤ minimum{0.90*PA, 2}. 
 
Celsia :  This is the poorest of the three countries, but has a fairly large sub-population  
(n = 700) who would benefit from the new prescription medicine.  Due to the country’s 
financial difficulties, it will only pay a limited amount for novel drugs and insists that its 
price be less than or equal to the lowest prices charged.  Therefore, the price in Celsia is 
constrained by 
 PCmax = $3 / dose 
PCt ≤ minimum {PA, PB}. 
 
All countries encourage parallel trade and it is 100% efficient (i.e. if parallel trade occurs, 
the entire market will be supplied with the imported goods).  Assuming that an 85% price 
differential among countries is sufficient to permit the occurrence of parallel trade, then, 
given the maximum prices that each country will permit, Acacia could import from both 
Beta and Celsia while Beta could import from Celsia.  Celsia can only serve as a source 
for parallel trade goods. 
 
The pharmaceutical company wishes to maximize the revenue it receives from the sale of 
its product in these three countries.  Mathematically it is maximizing 
 R = ∑
t
 (DA* PAt  + DB* PBt + DC* PCt) 
 
Since this case study presents the point of view of the pharmaceutical company, the 
details of parallel trade including transportation costs and actual price of the good when it 
is resold are not of interest.  For the pharmaceutical company, parallel trade simply 
represents a loss of revenue (the demand in a given country is supplied with the 
pharmaceutical product purchased at a lower price in a different country). 
 
The pharmaceutical company can choose to launch the product simultaneously or 
sequentially in any of the three countries.  However, given the geographical reference 
pricing of the countries, it is not possible to launch the product only in Acacia and Beta.  
However, it is possible to launch in Acacia and/or Celsia as well as in Beta and/or Celsia 
without launching in the third country.   
 
The pharmaceutical company may now consider its strategic launch decisions.  Let the 
company employ a 5% discount rate.  The 3-year discounted earnings for the 5 best 
launch sequences are shown in Table 2.  
 
If the pharmaceutical firm wanted to maintain the highest possible price for its 
medication, it would only launch the product in Acacia.  This would allow it to charge 
$5/dose for all three years.  This strategy would produce revenues of $12,867. 
 
If the pharmaceutical firm wanted to capture the large market in Celsia, it could choose to 
launch either sequentially or simultaneously with Acacia.  Launching sequentially would 
permit the firm to charge the maximum price ($5/dose in Acacia) until it launches in 
Celsia.  Once it launches in Celsia, the price in Celsia would be $3/dose and the price in 
Acacia would drop to $4.5/dose due to the international benchmarking.  However, due to 
parallel trade, the effective revenue seen by the firm would be for a price of $3/dose (i.e. 
the price in Celsia, which would become the source of parallel trade for Acacia).  
Launching in Acacia in year 1 and launching in Celsia in year 2 would produce revenues 
of $13,425.  Launching simultaneously in both countries would allow the firm to capture 
the larger market one year sooner, but the effective price for the entire market would be 
$3/dose due to parallel trade. This strategy would produce revenues of $13,725.   
 
Given the choice between Acacia and Beta, it is clear that more revenue can be realized 
in all launch scenarios involving Acacia since it has both the greater market as well as the 
higher price.  Launching in Beta and Celsia simultaneously provides the greatest revenue 
involving only these two countries, with a 3-year total discounted revenue of $8,864 – 
well below the other alternatives presented in Table 2. 
 
The firm could also consider launching in all three countries simultaneously.  Given the 
geographical reference pricing, the price in Beta and Celsia would be $2/dose and the 
price in Acacia would be $2.6/dose.  As the price differential between these countries is 
greater than 85%, parallel trade would occur for the market in Acacia and the effective 
price seen by the pharmaceutical firm would be $2/dose. This strategy would produce 
revenues of $10,580.   
 
Assuming that the strategy chosen with these three countries does not affect the prices in 
other countries, the pharmaceutical firm would choose to launch in Acacia and Celsia 
simultaneously as this generates the greatest expected revenue for the firm.  Note that the 
firm would not choose to launch in Beta. 
 
 
GENERAL MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
While for small problems it is feasible to examine all possible combinations of launch 
sequence and price to determine the optimal solution, this approach quickly becomes 
unmanageable.  Considering only two countries (and only two time periods), there are 9 
possible launch sequences, for example: A and B simultaneously, A then B, B then A, 
only A, only B, etc. If three countries were considered (and therefore 3 time periods), 
there would be well over 50 possible launch sequences.  However, the general pricing 
model for multiple countries can be expressed (and solved) as a mathematical model.  
 
The solution method for this mathematical model will depend in part on the assumptions 
surrounding the demand function for the prescription pharmaceutical product.  If we 
assume the demand for a prescription pharmaceutical is relatively independent of price, 
then the problem is a mixed integer linear program and can be solved relatively easily 
with standard algorithms.  If we assume instead that the demand is a function of price, Q 
= ƒ(P), then the problem is a mixed integer non-linear program because the objective 
function contains the term P*Q = P*ƒ(P), which is by definition non-linear in P.  This 
problem may still be solved, but it is much more difficult.   
 
Price elasticities in relation to prescription medicines have been found to be very small in 
absolute value indicating that demand is not very sensitive to price [2, 18].  Therefore, the 
mathematical model with a demand independent of price is presented.  This 
simplification makes use of the fact that demand for a pharmaceutical product is mostly 
inelastic up to a boundary price, at which point the product will no longer be purchased at 
all.   
  
Model Basis and Assumptions 
 
The problem is presented from the point of view of the pharmaceutical company, which 
is trying to maximize its revenue and hence its return on investment.  Geographical 
reference pricing introduces limits on the prices that can be charged in a given country 
and are included as a series of pricing constraints.  This model assumes that the amount 
of product that is purchased by individuals in a private capacity (uninsured and/or 
unreimbursed) is negligible.  Therefore, parallel trade is a loss of revenue, and does not 
provide a means of capturing additional market share.   
 
Constant and variable definitions are provided in Figure 1.  The mathematical 





The goal of the pharmaceutical company is to maximize the total discounted revenue 
over all countries and over all time periods.   However, parallel trade causes a loss of 
income in the country into which the goods are brought since the demand in that country 
is satisfied by a lower priced product from another country.  Therefore, the impact of 
parallel trade is a loss of revenue and must be incorporated in the objective function as a 








(1+r)t * (Pit * Qit – LMit * Qit * yit * [Pit – Zt])) (1) 
 
The second term in the summation of (1) represents the impact of parallel trade and is 




If there is a country j whose price is 85% or less than the price in country i, then parallel 
trade may occur from country j to country i, up to the percent of market share that may be 
susceptible to loss due to parallel trade in country i, LMit.  In the case study in the 
preceding section, LMit was set to 100% for ease of computation.  This is not likely to be 
the case in a practical application.  Chaudhry and Walsh [3] found that only 2 to 10% of 
the prescription pharmaceutical market was serviced by parallel trade.  However, this 
number is sure to have increased in the intervening years. 
 
If a suitably large price differential exists, yit is equal to 1 indicating the presence of 
parallel trade.  If the price differential between countries i and j is less than 15%, then yit 
is equal to 0 indicating that there is no parallel trade between the two countries.  Since it 
possible that there may be several countries which have the requisite 85% cost 
differential with country i, we assume that the parallel importer will choose to import the 
lowest cost product.  When calculating this lowest cost Zt, it is necessary to ensure that it 
is the minimum price of all the countries in which the product has been launched.  
Mathematically,  
 
Zt ≤  Pjt+ (1 – Sjt)*M            ∀ i ≠ j, t 
 
Thus, to determine whether the conditions enabling parallel trade are met, the following 
equations must hold true.  
 
Zt – 0.85*Pit ≤ M*(1- yit)                    ∀ i, t 
0.85*Pit – Zt ≤ M*yit                    ∀ i, t  
yit  є {0, 1}              ∀ i, t    
 
Therefore, the parallel importer will purchase the product to meet the demand in country i 
at time t for parallel imports (LMit*Qit) from the country which has the overall lowest 
price (Zt). 
 
Geographical Reference Pricing 
 
There are a wide variety of geographical reference pricing methods that have been 
employed by countries.  However, as the regulation of pharmaceutical products is a fast 
developing field, geographical reference pricing practice is also rapidly evolving.  All 
forms of geographical reference pricing can be included as a constraint in the 
mathematical model.  Three types of geographical reference are presented as examples of 
the types of links that may be present. 
 
Benchmark #1:  The price of a product in country i must be 5% lower than the price of 
the product in a set of reference countries.  If the product is not sold in the reference 
country (Sit equals zero), then the constraint is not binding (M is large). 
 
Pit ≤ 0.95*Pjt + (1 – Sjt)*M    ∀ t,j є {reference countries for country i}  
 
Benchmark #2:  The ratio of the price of the product and its closest competitor(s) in 
country k must be less than or equal to the ratio of the price of the product and its closest 
competition in the reference countries in which the product is sold. Let 
 
PAltkt = price of established alternative therapy in country k 
 
If the product is not sold in the reference country (Sit equals zero), then the constraint is 









P  * PAltkt + (1 – Sit)*M   ∀t, i є {reference countries for country k}  
 
Benchmark #3:  The price of a product in country j must be less than or equal to the 
average price of the product in a set of reference countries.  Mathematically, the most 
obvious representation of this constraint, 
 








 if  ∑
k
ktS ≠ 0 for  k є {reference countries for country j}  ∀ t 
is not linear in the decision variables, (Pit, Sit), and must therefore be rewritten before it 
can be included in a linear formulation.  This methodology is presented in the Technical 
Appendix. 
 
Other Constraints  
 
Several other price constraints need to be included in the model. First, prices may only 
decrease over time.   
 
Pit ≤ Pit+1  ∀i, t 
 
Secondly, prices must be positive  
 
Pit ≥ 0   ∀i, t 
 
Thirdly, given our assumption with respect to the demand curve, prices must be less than 
Pmaxi , the boundary price, below which there is a fixed positive demand of Qi and above 
which the demand drops to zero.  
 
Pit ≤ Pmaxit  ∀i, t  
 
In addition to these price constraints, there is also a constraint that needs to be placed on 
Sit, the indicator whether or not the product is launched in country i at time t.  Once a 
product is launched it is difficult to pull the product from the market.  Therefore, 
 
Sit+1 ≥ Sit            ∀i, t 
  Sit є{0, 1}            ∀i, t 
 
Taken together, these equations are a mixed integer linear program.  A summary of 
definitions is provided in Figure 1.  The complete mathematical formulation is given in 
Figure 2.  Solution algorithms and commercial codes for solving mixed integer linear 
programs have been available for many years (e.g. see Nemhauser and Wolsey [19]) and 




The model provides a structured analysis of the global strategic pricing problem faced by 
pharmaceutical companies at the macro-level.  It explicitly takes into account the 
interdependencies that arise during pricing decisions due to geographical reference 
pricing and parallel trade.  Incorporating some simplifying assumptions about the demand 
curve, the problem is solvable by standard, commercially available software. 
 
The case study shows numerous interesting general results (Table 2).  The highest drug 
price is not always the best option nor is a low drug price always the worst option in a 
given country.  What may have been an optimal pricing strategy in a single country is no 
longer optimal when considering the international ramifications of this price.  This result 
can already be observed in some pharmaceutical firms’ current pricing choices.  For 
example, a new pricing control strategy in New Zealand should have resulted in the 
prices of ACE inhibitors to be reduced.  However, despite new reimbursement limits, the 
existence of a competitor who product was priced at the low limit, and a documented 
subsequent loss of market share, some pharmaceutical firms did not lower the price of 
their ACE inhibitors.  The authors of the study suspect that geographical reference 
pricing is the cause of some of the continued higher prices [20].  Models such as the one 
proposed in this paper can help in the strategic analysis of these decisions. 
 
This strategic pricing model simultaneously provides the prices and launch sequence for 
the pharmaceutical product.  The variable Sit equals 1 when the product is launched in 
country i.  As seen in the case study presented in this paper, some countries may 
experience long delays due to geographical reference pricing and parallel import 
concerns.  The launch of a product may be delayed until there is a change in the 
parameters surrounding the questions, such as the introduction of a new competitor who 
would factor into the reference pricing calculations.  For this reason, the general model is 
a dynamic model capturing expected changes over time.  Changes will occur at the latest 
when a product is no longer patent protected and generic versions can be produced.  
Delayed launches have already been observed with current pharmaceutical products.  In 
New Zealand, a statin was not marketed due to the low reference price required and 
subsequent the fears of the impact of geographical reference pricing [20].   In addition, 
some European countries experience long delays in patient access to pharmaceutical 
products due to their product pricing and reimbursement policies [11, 14, 17].   
 
The model requires information and data that must be obtained before it can be 
implemented.  The format of international benchmarking policies used by each country in 
the analysis needs to be ascertained.  Some benchmarks are more qualitative than 
quantitative [17].  These qualitative measures need to be quantified with regards to their 
typical implementation and influence on the pricing process in that country.  Secondly, 
the market size and likely market share of the product needs to be estimated in each 
country i and time t to develop the variable Qit.  Similarly, the price range over which this 
demand is likely to hold has to be determined, providing an estimate of Pmax.  Finally, the 
market share in each country i and time t, LMit, that is vulnerable to parallel imports must 
be determined. 
 
The model development process employed several simplifications and these can all be 
considered limitations to the model.   A large assumption was the simplified demand 
function.  If we assume instead that the demand is a function of price, then the problem is 
a mixed integer non-linear program and several new methods and codes have recently 
become available for this type of problem [21]. A Website 
(http://www.gamsworld.org/minlp/) has been devoted to practitioners solving this type of 
problem, providing links to available software and comparisons of different solution 
methods.  However, a more practical solution would be to approximate the objective 
function by a piece-wise linear function.  In particular, it may be feasible to determine 
price ranges over which a given quantity of demand is inelastic.  The successive series of 
ranges (with fixed demand within the range) would be a piece-wise linear approximation 
of the demand function and may well summarize the level of detail known about the 
market place. 
 
The model currently focuses on revenue and does not incorporate the price of launching a 
product in a given country, the potential interdependencies of launches in different 
countries, nor the costs of supplying the product to each market.  This choice was made 
to keep the model more tractable. 
 
In the current formulation, the model views parallel trade as a negative, a loss of potential 
revenue.  However, this need not always be the case.  Given the issues of parallel trade 
and international benchmarking, the model predicts that there may be some countries 
which may experience long delays until the product is officially launched in their 
country.  Some of the demand in these countries may be serviced through parallel 
imports.  In this case, parallel trade would actually be a boon both to the consumer, who 
has access to the medicine if they can afford the cost of the medicine privately, and to the 
pharmaceutical firm, who will realize greater sales of their drug.  This facet of sales in a 
country in which the product has not officially been launched can be readily incorporated 
into the model objective function.  In order to do this, it is necessary to estimate the size 
of the demand for the privately purchased market that may be service by parallel imports.  
This quantity would then be multiplied by Zt, the lowest price in the countries which have 
been launched at time t – assumed to be the source of parallel imports, and added to the 
objective function.  This has not been included in the current model formulation because 
determining the quantities of demand that will be privately financed is difficult and will 
depend greatly on the actual price of the medication.  This runs counter to the simplified 
demand function currently proposed.  However, this is a feasible model extension, 
especially if a non-constant demand function is chosen in the general model. 
 
The model does not consider the transportation costs faced by the parallel importer.  If 
there were substantial differences depending on the country of origin, the parallel 
importer may not always choose the lowest price country as the source for parallel 
imports (and may indeed choose multiple sources if transportation costs vary by both 
origin and destination).  These costs represent a large amount of data for which the 
pharmaceutical firm has no readily available source.  The model as presented is a worst 
case scenario in terms of the impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical revenues. 
 
While the model does not cover all possible complexities encountered by a 
pharmaceutical firm during its global strategic pricing process, it does provide insight 
into the issues surrounding geographical reference pricing and parallel trade.  As the 
barriers to importation across nations of pharmaceutical products are lowered and as 
more countries consider geographical reference pricing as a means of controlling 
pharmaceutical costs, the global pricing decision becomes more complicated.  An 
analytical means to asses the interdependencies of pricing decisions will become an 
imperative.  The general model formulation provided in this paper is designed to serve as 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
It is possible to linearly express the constraint that a given price be lower than the average 
price of a select set of international benchmark countries.  For example, suppose country 
D wants to ensure that its price, PD, is less than the average price of countries A, B, and 
C.  The intuitive formulation for this constraint is 
 








 if  ∑
k
ktS ≠ 0 for  k є {A,B,C}   ∀ t   (1a) 
 
However, this formulation is not linear.  In order to come up with a linear function to 
provide us the same constraint, it is necessary to replace (1a) with a series of 7 equations.  
The following constraints provide the necessary price limitation expressed by (1a): 
 
PDt ≤  PAt + M*(1-SAt) + M*SBt + M*SCt  
PDt ≤  PBt + M*(1-SBt) + M*SAt + M*SCt  
PDt ≤  PCt + M*(1-SCt) + M*SAt + M*SBt  
PDt ≤ (PAt+PBt)/2 + M*(1-SAt) + M*(1- SBt) + M*SCt   
PDt ≤ (PAt+PCt)/2 + M*(1-SAt) + M*(1- SCt) + M*SBt 
PDt ≤ (PBt+PCt)/2 + M*(1-SBt) + M*(1- SCt) + M*SAt  
PDt ≤ (PAt+PBt +PCt)/3 + M*(1-SAt) + M*(1- SBt) + M*(1-SCt) 
 
The number of new equations that need to be added to have a set of linear constraints 
instead of a set of non-linear constraints grows combinatorially with respect to the 
number of countries used as an international benchmark.  In specific, if country D used 4 
countries as international benchmarks, it would be necessary to add 15 equations.  In 

















 constraints.  
 
FIGURE LEGENDS AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.  Constant and Variable Definitions 
 




 Figure 1.  Constant and Variable Definitions 
 
Indices and Constants 
t = year (or other unit of time)  
i (j,k) = country  
r = discount rate applied to cost and revenues 
Qit = the amount of (projected) demand in country i during period t 
Pmaxit = boundary price, i.e. the maximum price that can be charged for the product 
in country i (regardless of the regulatory mechanisms of country i) at time 
t 
PAltit = price of established alternative therapy in country i at time t 
LMit = the market share that is lost in country i at time t due to parallel trade 
M = an arbitrarily large number 
Calculated Variables 
Zt =  the price in the lowest priced country which will serve as the source for 
parallel imports at time t  
yit =  indicator of parallel trade in country i in time period t. (binary) 
Decision Variables 
Sit = indicates whether or not the product is launched in country i at time t  
(binary) 
Pit = price of product in country i at time t 
 
 










(1+r)t * (Pit * Qit – LMit * Qit * yit * [Pit – Zt]))  
 
s.t. 
Zt – 0.85*Pit ≤ M*(1- yit)                   ∀ i, t 
0.85*Pit – Zt ≤ M*yit                    ∀ i, t  
Zt ≤ Pjt + M*(1 – Sjt)                    ∀ i ≠ j, t 
 









P  * PAltjt + (1 – Sit)*M   ∀t, i є {reference countries for country j}*  
Sit ≤ Sit+1    ∀i,t 
Pit ≤ Pit+1    ∀i,t 
Pit ≤ Pmaxit    ∀i,t  
Pit ≤ Sit*M    ∀i,t 
Pit  ≥  0    ∀i,t 
yit є {0, 1}    ∀ i, t    
Sit є {0, 1}    ∀i, t 
 
 
*   For ease of exposition, Benchmark #3 was not included in this formulation.  To 
include this benchmark, it is necessary to add the equations developed in the 





Table 1.  Summary country characteristics 
Country Acacia Beta Celsia 
Demand 900 250 700 
Max Price $5 $4 $3 
Geographical 
Reference 
PAt ≤ Average  
{1.1*PBt, 1.5*PCt}
PBt ≤ Minimum {0.90*PAt, 2  
(if launched in Acacia and Celsia)} 






Table 2.  Total discounted earnings by launch sequence 
 Launch ONLY in  Acacia 
Launch in  
Acacia Year 1  
Celsia Year 2 
Launch BOTH  
Acacia and  
Celsia 
Launch BOTH  
Beta and  
Celsia 
Launch ALL  
countries  



















Year 1 $4,500 $5  $4,500 $5  $4,800 $3  $3,100 $3 $3,700 $2 
Year 2 $4,286 $5  $4,571 $3  $4,571 $3  $2,952 $3 $3,524 $2 
Year 3 $4,082 $5  $4,354 $3   $4,354 $3  $2,811 $3 $3,356 $2 
Total  $12,867  $13,425  $13,725  $8,864  $10,580  
 
* This is the effective price per dose seen by the pharmaceutical company due to parallel trade and 
geographical reference pricing 
